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Abstract
We investigate the security design problem in an initial public offering (IPO). In line with
Rock (1986), we consider a situation in which some investors are better informed than others
about the prospects of the firm, resulting in a winner’s curse problem. To raise capital, the
owners of the firm must underprice the securities they issue in order to compensate the less
informed investors for their willingness to participate in the issue. In this context, we first show
that firms can sometimes lower the cost of going public by using unit IPOs, in which equity and
warrants are combined into a non-divisible package. Because warrants are less sensitive to low
cash flow realizations, unit IPOs tend to be valuable to firms that face large downside risks or
whose uncertainty revolves around the eventual performance of their assets in place. Second,
we show that firms may be able to completely eliminate the winner’s curse problem by making
the warrants callable. Such a first-best scenario is possible when a firm’s growth potential is
sizeable even in bad states of the world, as the callability feature of the warrant allows the firm
to dynamically create payoffs that are insensitive to the investors’ private information. Our
theory is consistent with the prominent use of unit IPOs and produces empirical implications
that differentiate it from existing theories.
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Security Design in Initial Public Offerings

Abstract
We investigate the security design problem in an initial public offering (IPO). In line with
Rock (1986), we consider a situation in which some investors are better informed than others about
the prospects of the firm, resulting in a winner’s curse problem. To raise capital, the owners of the
firm must underprice the securities they issue in order to compensate the less informed investors for
their willingness to participate in the issue. In this context, we first show that firms can sometimes
lower the cost of going public by using unit IPOs, in which equity and warrants are combined into
a non-divisible package. Because warrants are less sensitive to low cash flow realizations, unit IPOs
tend to be valuable to firms that face large downside risks or whose uncertainty revolves around
the eventual performance of their assets in place. Second, we show that firms may be able to
completely eliminate the winner’s curse problem by making the warrants callable. Such a first-best
scenario is possible when a firm’s growth potential is sizeable even in bad states of the world, as the
callability feature of the warrant allows the firm to dynamically create payoffs that are insensitive
to the investors’ private information. Our theory is consistent with the prominent use of unit IPOs
and produces empirical implications that differentiate it from existing theories.

1

Introduction

The winner’s curse problem in initial public offerings (IPOs) is well-known. As described by
Rock (1986), the potential presence of investors who are better informed than others implies that
lesser-informed investors tend to end up with a larger (smaller) allocation of shares when the issue is overpriced (underpriced). Anticipating this possibility, uninformed investors require a lower
price to subscribe to the issue in the first place. This discount and associated reduction in proceeds is costly to the firm, as empirically documented by Koh and Walter (1989), Keloharju (1993),
Michaely and Shaw (1994), and numerous authors following them.1
In this paper we study how optimally designed securities can limit, and possibly even eliminate,
the amount of money that new issuers must leave on the table to ensure the success of their offering.
Our solution comes in the form of package offerings consisting of an appropriate mix of equity and
warrants that cannot be sold separately to new investors. These packages are similar to the unit
offerings which, according to Schultz (1993) and Jain (1994), are used in 15-20% of IPOs in the
United States.2
In our model, a fraction of outside investors hold some information about the eventual distribution of the firm’s future value. This information can be related to various aspects of value. For
example, investors may have better information about the profitability of the firm’s future investment (i.e., the firm’s growth potential), the future performance of the firm’s existing assets, or the
firm’s liquidation values in the event that the firm goes bankrupt. As such, uninformed investors
face a winner’s curse problem with respect to the firm’s upside potential, its downside risk, or both.
In this context, our paper establishes two sets of results. The first compares the sensitivity of
cash flows from a warrant to the investors’ private information, relative to that of equity. Because
warrants pay off only when the firm realizes some of its growth potential, the value of these securities
is less sensitive than that of equity for low realizations of firm value. Consequently, when the
informed investors’ information relates mainly to the firm’s downside risk and/or the eventual
performance of its assets in place, uninformed investors are less at an informational disadvantage
when warrants are included in the IPO. This reduces both the negative effect of the winner’s curse
and the firm’s cost of going public. In contrast, when the informational advantage of informed
1

See Ritter and Welch (2002) for an excellent survey of the literature on IPO underpricing and IPOs in general.
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The use of warrants in IPOs is not unique to firms in the United States. For example, the use of warrants in
IPOs is also prevalent in Israel (Hauser and Levy, 1996; Kandel, Sarig and Wohl, 1999) and Australia (How and
Howe, 2001; Lee, Lee and Taylor, 2003).
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investors is about the upside potential of the firm, a standard equity-only IPO is better.
In either case, the reduction of the winner’s curse is not perfect. Indeed, like the payoff of
equity-only IPOs, the payoff of unit IPOs is strictly increasing in the firm’s eventual value, and
so the winner’s curse problem can never be fully eliminated by packaging standard warrants with
equity. The paper’s second main result shows that this can be fixed by allowing warrants that
are callable by the firm before they expire. Since any initial difference of information about the
firm’s future is likely to be revealed in the secondary market via trading and/or via observing the
performance of the firm over time, call provisions that allow the firm to force early exercise enable
it to dynamically create securities whose payoffs are not as valuable in high states of the world.
More precisely, by choosing an appropriately large trigger value for calling the warrants, the firm
commits to force their early conversion only when the firm’s (interim) market value is consistent
with good information initially held by informed investors. By setting the warrants’ strike price
so that the payoff from this early exercise of the option is low, the firm is able to extinguish a
valuable option when this happens. On the other hand, when the interim market value of the firm
is not sufficiently high, the firm cannot force exercise and investors do not exercise early. Since the
probability of a valuable option being extinguished early is positively correlated with the initial
information of informed investors, such restrictive call provisions effectively provide insurance from
the winner’s curse to uninformed investors at the time of the IPO. In fact, if the firm’s potential
profitability in the bad states of the world, even though lower than in the good states, is sufficiently
large, such restrictive call provisions allow the firm to dynamically create a security whose eventual
payoff is insensitive to the private information initially held by informed investors. Such a security
completely eliminates the winner’s curse problem and yields the first-best outcome.
Parlour and Rajan (2005) also study an IPO problem in which investors are differentially informed. They show that the firm’s commitment to rationing before the IPO alleviates the winner’s
curse problem and allows the firm to generate more revenues from the issue. On the one hand,
rationing is costly in that the highest bidder does not get the full equity allocation; on the other
hand, rationing benefits the firm by reducing the investors’ concern about the winner’s curse and by
making them more aggressive in their bidding on average. Their work builds onto the bookbuilding
approach of Benveniste and Spindt (1989), under which the firm must underprice and preferentially allocate shares to informed investors in order to elicit truthful information revelation.3 In
3

This bookbuilding approach has been empirically investigated by Hanley and Wilhelm (1995), and Cornelli and
Goldreich (2001).
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both these papers, the focus is on the mechanism by which the firm allocates shares and arrives at
an issue price. That is, these papers minimize the impact of information asymmetries by designing allocation mechanisms that preclude informed investors from excessively gouging uninformed
investors. Our approach is complementary, in that we also look to minimize the costs associated
with the winner’s curse, but focus more on the securities being sold rather than the mechanism
by which they are sold. More specifically, our model keeps the allocation mechanism fixed and instead concentrates on the design of securities whose sensitivity to information asymmetries across
investors is minimized.
To our knowledge, only two theories have been advanced for the use of warrants in IPOs.
Schultz (1993) argues that unit IPOs serve the same purpose as staged equity financing in venture
capital (e.g., Sahlman, 1990). The idea is that, by providing the firm with a series of capital
infusions, unit offerings reduce the agency costs associated with free cash flows (e.g., Jensen, 1986).
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) argue that the inclusion of warrants in IPOs helps risk-averse
insiders signal the high quality of their firm when outcomes are risky. The idea is that risk-averse
entrepreneurs wishing to diversify their position value the risky high-state payoffs less than investors
and so warrants that pay only in those states provide a cheaper way to signal firm quality than
underpricing (e.g., Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989) or equity retention (e.g., Leland and Pyle, 1977).
Like these other two theories, our model predicts that young, small and risky firms will tend
to include warrants in their IPOs. Our prediction about risk, however, is a bit sharper than that
of these other theories, as it is downside risk and asymmetric information about that risk that
prompts firms to include warrants in their IPOs. For the same total firm risk, only firms whose
assets in place are riskier will tend to use unit IPOs. For example, firms with intangible assets
and firms that are heavily invested in research and development (R&D) are predicted to include
warrants in their security offering when they first go public. Of course, for the downside risk to
matter and create a potential winner’s curse problem, this risk has to be significant. This is why
our model also predicts that firms using unit IPOs will tend to subsequently go bankrupt more
often and more quickly than firms that go the equity-only route.
In our model, the presence of existing senior debt affects the relative importance of upside
potential versus downside risk for the new claimants at the time of the IPO. This implies that
the benefits of including warrants in the IPO will be affected by the firm’s financing prior to the
IPO. In particular, low levels of unsecured debt are unlikely to affect the balance between downside
risk and upside risk, but high levels of debt mean that existing debtholders already absorb a large
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portion of the downside risk. As a result, we predict that unit IPOs are more likely to be used by
firms with low levels of existing debt.
Our model yields additional testable implications regarding the characteristics of the warrants
that firms will include in their IPOs. First, our optimality result about the callability of warrants is
new to the IPO literature, as neither Schultz (1993) or Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) consider
the possibility that the packaged warrants are callable. It is also consistent with Schultz’s (1993)
finding that almost 90% of warrants in unit IPOs are callable. Second, we show that the inclusion
of callable warrants makes unit offerings optimal when the option value of the firm is significant
even after negative shocks. In fact, because warrant options can be quite valuable to investors in
bad times, firms will tend to include a higher proportion of warrants (relative to shares of equity) in
their IPO packages in an effort to balance the value of these packages in subsequent good and bad
states of the world. Finally, our model shows that the warrants that are most efficient in reducing
the winner’s curse problem are characterized by low call prices and high exercise prices (i.e., they
will be out of the money at issue).
Our analysis of unit IPOs in terms of information sensitivity of different securities is related
to the large literature on security design under asymmetric information.4 For instance, Nachman
and Noe (1994) and DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) study the adverse selection problem of a firm
that has some information that outside investors do not have (Myers and Majluf, 1984). This is
distinct from the winner’s curse problem of a firm facing imperfect competition among differentially
informed outside investors, as we study in this paper. Nevertheless, the conditions that we identify,
under which a package of junior claims (like warrants) and senior claims (like equity) has lower
information sensitivity relative to equity only, are similar to those under which the usual pecking
order will be reversed in adverse selection environments. For instance, under the same conditions,
a package of debt and equity (or warrants) will lead to less dilution than issuing only debt in the
framework of Myers and Majluf (1984).
Our results about the inclusion of securities with path-dependent contingencies in IPOs share
some similarities with Chakraborty and Yılmaz’s (2006) results about the optimality of financing
projects with convertible securities. Our results also share some conceptual similarities with those
of Brennan and Kraus (1987) and Constantinides and Grundy (1989) who show that the firm’s
commitment to buy back debt or equity allows it to credibly signal and finance valuable projects.
4

While mechanism design problems with correlated signals may in general allow (almost) costless information
extraction (e.g., Crémer and McLean, 1988), the restrictions on the set of allowable contracts (e.g., limited liability
constraints) do not allow this in our setting.
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An important difference between their work and ours is that these authors assume that the security
that is bought back by the firm is exogenous and has been previously issued. We also focus on
a different informational problem in capital markets: the winner’s curse as opposed to adverse
selection. Consequently, security design has no signaling role in our setting. Finally, Axelson (2007)
studies the tradeoff between issuing debt and issuing equity in an auction setting, and relates the
optimal security to the number of bidders. More specifically, his model shows that debt (equity)
is the preferred choice when competition is low (high) among investors. In contrast, the number
of participants to the IPO in our model is fixed, and our analysis focuses on the potential use of
(callable) warrants in unit IPOs, depending on the properties of underlying cash flows.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up our model. In Section 3
we present our results on unit versus standard IPOs based on the information sensitivity of these
securities. In Section 4, we generalize the model to accommodate the possibility for the firm to make
the warrants callable. We show that this often allows the firm to fully eliminate the winner’s curse
problem. The empirical implications of the model are discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6
summarizes and concludes. All proofs are contained in Appendix A.

2

The Setup

Consider a two-date economy in which the riskless discount rate is zero and all agents are riskneutral. At the outset, an all-equity firm privately owned by an entrepreneur must raise some capital
through an initial public offering (IPO) in order to undertake a new project.5 More specifically,
the firm seeks to raise C > 0 in capital, the initial cost of the project.6 The firm’s total cash flows,
from both the firm’s existing assets and the new project, are denoted by V . The IPO takes place
at t = 0. At that time, the potential investors in the IPO are differentially informed about the
likely distribution of V , giving rise to a winner’s curse problem that is costly to the firm. At the
end of the period (time t = 1), the cash flows of the securities issued by the firm are realized and
investors in these securities receive their payoffs.7
The uncertainty about the firm’s prospects is captured by two states of nature, s = 2 and s = 1,
5

We consider the effect of existing debt on our results later in the paper.
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Equivalently, the firm’s existing shareholders want to cash out an amount C of their shares for exogenous reasons.
In this paper we do not model the reason behind or the timing of an IPO, but rather focus on the question of optimal
security design given that an IPO must take place. These other issues are studied more specifically by Zingales (1995),
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999), and Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999).
7

Until Section 4 in which we introduce callable warrants, we do not allow the firm to issue securities that can pay
off at an intermediate date between t = 0 and t = 1.
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that occur with probability λ and 1 − λ respectively, 0 < λ < 1. While a state s contains pertinent
information about cash flows, we assume that cash flows are uncertain even given knowledge of s.
Specifically, let Φs (v) denote the probability that the uncertain future cash flow V is less than or
equal to some realized value v ≥ 0, given a state s. We assume that the distribution Φ2 dominates
Φ1 in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, i.e., Φ2 (v) ≤ Φ1 (v) for all v ∈ [0, ∞), with a
strict inequality for a subset of strictly positive measure, and that they have finite moments.8 Let


us denote the expected value of V in state s by Vs ≡ E V | s .
Some of the firm’s future cash flows in state s come from its existing assets and these cash

flows, denoted by A, are realized whether or not the new project is undertaken. The rest, V − A,
represents the cash flows of the project, which is assumed to have a positive net present value
and is worth undertaking in both states of the world; that is, Vs − As > C for s = 1, 2, where


As ≡ E A | s . This implies that, in a first-best scenario without any information asymmetries,

the firm will raise C and invest in the project regardless of the state of the world, with the choice

of securities irrelevant for shareholder welfare. However, as we show, when potential investors are
differentially informed about the state s at t = 0, the choice of securities matters.
We assume that a fraction µ > 0 of the outside investors learn the state of the world s at t = 0,
while the firm and all the other outside investors do not. Although some uncertainty remains
through Φs , the informed investors’ knowledge of s allows them to identify and stay away from
overpriced issues, as in Rock (1986). In general, the informational advantage of informed investors
depends on the differences between Φ1 and Φ2 .9
Given a price at which the firm offers the issue, each investor decides whether or not to subscribe.
Since some investors are potentially informed, other uninformed investors face a winner’s curse
problem. Uninformed investors are more likely to obtain a larger allotment when informed investors
choose not to subscribe to the issue, i.e., exactly when the true value of the claims sold is not worth
the price given the informed investors’ information.10 In order to guarantee the success of the IPO,
the firm is forced to underprice the issue in its effort to mitigate this winner’s curse problem facing
8

This is the most general order that generates a non-trivial informational cost for standard securities such as equity
and warrants. We discuss later how our results are tightened if one considers stricter orders such as the monotone
likelihood ratio property (see, e.g., DeMarzo and Duffie, 1999).
9
While this information structure is particularly simple and similar to Rock (1986), our qualitative results extend
to other informational environments, e.g., the one used in Benveniste and Spindt (1989).
10

We assume that there are many informed (as well as many uninformed) investors, so that competition forces
informed investors to subscribe to the issue when the true value of the claims sold is worth the price, as subsequent
gains from trading are expected to be small. See Chakraborty and Yılmaz (2003) for a model of IPOs where the
participation decision of informed investors is endogenized similarly in the presence of secondary markets.
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uninformed investors. Such underpricing imposes a deadweight loss on the existing stake-holders
in the firm. We wish to characterize the set of securities that minimizes this cost.11
We assume that the set P of feasible securities available to the firm consists of any package of
equity and call warrants.12 Given that the firm is initially all-equity financed, a share α ∈ [0, 1) of
equity entitles investors to cash flows of αV when total firm cash flows equal V . If β ∈ [0, 1 − α]
denotes the additional equity share that the packaged warrants entitle investors to upon paying
an amount X per warrant (for a total exercise price of βX), the additional cash flows from the
warrants is given by β max{V − X, 0}, where max{V − X, 0} is the payoff from each warrant.
The total cash flow from the package is denoted by P (α, β, X) = αV + β max{V − X, 0}.13 We
denote the expected value of a warrant with an exercise price of X given a state s = 1, 2 by
h
i
ws (X) = E max{V − X, 0} | s , and summarize the set of feasible packages of equity shares and
warrants available to the firm by

n
o
P ≡ P (α, β, X) : α ≥ ᾱ, β ≥ 0, α + β ≤ 1, X > 0 .
The set P is constrained to include only packages with a minimum number ᾱ > 0 of shares, where
ᾱ can be made arbitrarily close to zero. This assumption is made purely for realism purposes, as
no firm ever goes public by issuing warrants only, the reason (e.g., liquidity, cost of issue, etc.)
being outside the model. Frequently, this constraint will not bind for the optimal package. The
constraint on X states that the warrants are non-trivial while the constraint α + β ≤ 1 states that
at most the entire firm may be sold.
Since our main objective is to contrast standard IPOs (that include only equity) with unit IPOs
(that include equity and warrants in a single package) in terms of how their pricing is affected
by the winner’s curse, our results revolve around the comparison between β = 0 and β > 0. In
particular, in what follows, the unit IPO is said to dominate a standard IPO when there exists
an equity-warrant package with β > 0 and X > 0 that dominates every equity-only package with
11

To be sure, if these costs are severe enough, the firm may decide to design an IPO that fails with some probability,
a possibility of underinvestment and associated deadweight costs that we ignore in this paper. To ensure that
underinvestment is suboptimal for the firm, it is enough to assume that the project’s net present value in state s = 1
is large enough.
12

While this focus is entirely empirically motivated, our approach and insight cover a larger class of securities, such
as debt and convertibles.
13

As shown in Appendix B, this accounting convention is without loss of generality, as it is equivalent to one in
which shareholders are entitled to their share of the strike price that is paid to the firm when the warrants are
exercised. This convention allows us to treat the equity share α separately from the additional share β the warrant
holders are entitled to. Our results will be unchanged under alternative but analytically cumbersome conventions.
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Payoff at
time t = 1
current all-equity firm

1
αU + β U

equity-warrant unit IPO
standard equity-only IPO
αE

αU
0

V

X

Figure 1: The above graph shows the cash flows that investors will receive as a function of the
firm’s cash flows when the IPO consists of equity only (αE > 0, β E = 0) or a package of equity and
warrants (αU > 0, β U > 0, X > 0).
β = 0.14 Figure 1 depicts how the payoffs from the two financing strategies differ as a function
of V .
Notice that the payoff of any package P (α, β, X) ∈ P is increasing in the underlying cash
flows V . Since the firm’s total cash flows in state s = 2 stochastically dominate those in state
s = 1, this implies that the expected value of the claims issued is always higher conditional on
s = 2 than on s = 1, leading informed outside investors to stay away from a fairly priced issue
(i.e, one whose price reflects only ex ante information) in state s = 1 but to subscribe to it in
state s = 2. In other words, the issue is more likely to be oversubscribed in state s = 2. As a
result, uninformed investors whose subscription choice cannot depend on s (as it is unknown to
them) are more likely to be allocated the issue in state s = 1: they suffer from the winner’s curse
in that state. From their perspective, the effective probability that state s = 2 occurs, conditional
on being allocated the issue, is smaller than the unconditional probability λ of that state occurring.
We denote this effective probability by θ < λ, where θ close to zero (to λ) corresponds to a large
value of µ and thus a large (small) winner’s curse problem for uninformed investors.
Since the firm can only invest if the issue succeeds, it designs the issue to ensure that uninformed
investors are willing to subscribe and break even by paying C. It is then necessary that the expected
value of the claims sold under the conditional beliefs θ, as denoted by P̄θ , must equal the required
14

A similar terminology is used in section 4, in which we allow the warrants to be callable and the resulting packages
are referred to as callable unit IPOs.
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outlay C. But then the true (unconditional expected) value of the claims sold, P̄λ , derived from the
prior beliefs λ, will typically exceed P̄θ = C. The difference P̄λ − P̄θ = (λ − θ)(P2 − P1 ) ≥ 0 is the
(ex ante) expected informational cost to the firm associated with the offering,15 where Ps ≡ E[P | s]
denotes the expected value of the package in state s. Clearly, this informational cost can be
alleviated via a reduction in λ − θ or in P2 − P1 . The former approach effectively corresponds to
that followed by Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Parlour and Rajan (2005), who study how an
efficient allocation of shares across investors can reduce the extent of information asymmetries.16 In
contrast, we fix the share allocation mechanism, and focus instead on a security design approach that
characterizes the package P ∈ P of equity and (callable or non-callable) warrants that minimizes
the cost P2 − P1 .

3

Optimal IPOs with Non-Callable Warrants

3.1

The General Case

To minimize P2 − P1 , the firm must choose the package P ∈ P that has the lowest payoff sensitivity
to the private information held by informed investors at time t = 0. Proposition 1 identifies a
general condition under which this is achieved by a unit IPO as opposed to a standard IPO. To
h
i
state the result, we use Ds (X) ≡ E min{X, V } | s = Vs − Ws (X), which is the expected portion

of firm value that does not belong to warrant holders when α and β are arbitrarily close to zero
and one respectively. This quantity can also be interpreted as a zero-coupon debt claim with a face

value of X written on the firm’s final cash flow. Of course, this debt claim is purely fictitious here,
as debt is never packaged in an IPO.17
Proposition 1. There is a unit IPO that strictly dominates the standard IPO if and only if there
exists X > 0 such that
D2 (X)
D1 (X)
>
.
V2
V1

(1)

The intuition for this result is as follows. The value of a call warrant with a strike price of X
in state s depends only on the distribution of upside cash flows (i.e., the portion of V above X). If
15

It is also equal to the ex ante expected profits of informed investors, as uninformed investors earn zero expected
profits in equilibrium.
16

Note that this correspondence is not perfect, since their multiple-states models do not map directly into ours.

17

Interestingly, a few of the Israeli IPOs in the sample used by Kandel, Sarig and Wohl (1999) pool debt along with
the new equity issue. As far as we know, this is never done elsewhere. Also, as we show in section 3.2, the presence
of previously issued debt does have an impact on our results.
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(1) does not hold for any X, the asymmetric information about expected cash flows on the upside
(as captured by the ratio
the ratio

D2 (X)
D1 (X) )

W2 (X)
W1 (X) )

is more severe than that involving the downside (as captured by

for all X. In such cases, informational asymmetry about overall or average cash

flows (as captured by the ratio

V2
V1 )

is also lower than that about the upside. This implies that the

winner’s curse cost of equity is lower than that of warrants, and so the firm favors a standard IPO
that consists entirely of equity. If however,

D2 (X)
V2

>

D1 (X)
V1

for some X > 0, then the asymmetry

of information is less severe on the upside (cash flows above X) than on the downside (cash flows
below X). In this case, including warrants with a strike price equal to X in the IPO will lower the
overall winner’s curse cost, as less money must then be raised via equity.
We now characterize the insight of Proposition 1 in terms of the properties of the distribution
of cash flows in a setting where Φs (·) admits a continuous density φs (·) that is positive on [0, ∞).
We consider the case with discrete support in section 3.2. To state the result concisely, we let
r(v) ≡

1−Φ2 (v)
1−Φ1 (v)

≥ 1. The behavior of r(v) captures the informational advantage of informed

investors as it pertains to the upside versus the downside.18
Proposition 2. Suppose that, for s = 1, 2, Φs (·) admits a continuous density φs (·) that is positive
on [0, ∞). (a) If r(v) is non-decreasing, the standard IPO strictly dominates any unit IPO. (b) If
limv→∞ r(v) <

V2
V1 ,

there is a unit IPO that strictly dominates the standard IPO.

When r(v) is non-decreasing, the two distributions become ‘increasingly different’ as v gets
larger. This means that the informational advantage of informed investors increases for high cash
flows. Consequently, warrants have larger winner’s curse costs than equity does, and a standard
IPO is optimal. Notice that r(v) is non-decreasing if and only if Φ2 dominates Φ1 in the sense
of hazard rates, i.e.,

φ2 (v)
1−Φ2 (v)

<

φ1 (v)
1−Φ1 (v)

(e.g., see Krishna, 2002). This last condition is stronger

than our assumed condition of first-order stochastic dominance, but weaker than the likelihood
ratio order (under which

φ2 (v)
φ1 (v)

is assumed to be increasing) that is frequently used in the literature.

Interestingly, therefore, part (a) of Proposition 2 establishes that unit IPOs are never optimal
when only likelihood ratio orders are considered in the winner’s curse problem. As part (b) of
Proposition 2 demonstrates, this is not the case when the distributions are ordered in the weaker
sense of first-order stochastic dominance.
To understand part (b), recall that the ratio r(v) =

1−Φ2 (v)
1−Φ1 (v)

effectively measures the informa-

tional advantage of informed investors with respect to cash flows above v. The condition that
18

The assumption that Φs admits a continuous density is used only for Proposition 2. Since all distributions can
be approximated by continuously differentiable ones, the same qualitative results obtain in general.
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limv→∞ r(v) <

V2
V1

then amounts to this informational advantage being less severe for high v than
R∞
[1−Φ2 (v)]dv
V2
R0∞
=
.
V1
[1−Φ1 (v)]dv
0
v ∗ , then r(v) = 1 for

it is on average, as measured by

For instance, if the distributions, Φ2 and Φ1

are identical above some cutoff

v > v ∗ and warrants with a strike price of v ∗

have no winner’s curse costs associated with them. Including such warrants in a unit IPO will then
be strictly better than a standard IPO.19

3.2

Binary Distributions

To highlight the intuition behind our results and to more precisely characterize the empirical
implications of our model, we revisit the results derived so far using simple binary distributions for
Φ1 and Φ2 . Specifically, let us assume that in state s, V is equal to Hs with probability φs ∈ (0, 1)
and to Ls with probability 1 − φs , where Hs > Ls > 0. Cash flows in state s = 2 first-order
stochastically dominate those in state s = 1, i.e., H2 ≥ H1 , L2 ≥ L1 and φ2 ≥ φ1 , with at least
one strict inequality. As one interpretation of this setup, we may think of As = Ls as the state-s
value of the firm’s assets in place at time t = 1. Then, Hs − Ls is the potential payoff of the growth

opportunity associated with the new project, and φs Hs − Ls its expected value.

This specification captures in a simple way the different kinds of informational advantage that

informed investors may have over uninformed ones. For instance, when H1 = H2 and φ1 = φ2 ,
their informational advantage revolves around the profitability of the firm’s existing assets and is
measured by L2 − L1 . Similarly, when L1 = L2 and H1 = H2 , the information is about the viability
of the new project. Finally, when L1 = L2 and φ1 = φ2 , they know more about the potential scale
of the new project. One can also think of s as the state of the industry upon which the firm’s future
profitability depends. That is, state s = 2 (s = 1) represents an industry that is likely to perform
well (poorly), but the success of any one firm is still affected by idiosyncratic factors, as captured
by φ2 (by φ1 ).
We start our treatment of this binary specification with the analogue of Proposition 2, in terms
of the various parameters introduced above.
Proposition 3. Suppose that Φ1 and Φ2 are binary distributions. If H1 ≤ L2 , the standard IPO
is strictly optimal. If H1 > L2 , there is a unit IPO that strictly dominates the standard IPO if and
19

The conditions in parts (a) and (b) of Proposition 2 are both sufficient. However, if attention is restricted to
distributions for which the hazard rates cross at most once, then it can be shown that the condition in part (b) is
also necessary for the unit IPO to dominate the standard IPO.
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only if
φ (H2 − L2 )
L2
> 2
.
φ1 L2 + (1 − φ1 )L1
φ1 (H1 − L2 )

(2)

When H1 ≤ L2 , the informational advantage of the informed investors is ordered in the sense
that they know whether cash flows will be high (at least L2 ) or low (at most H1 ). In this case,
including warrants that are valuable if and only if cash flows are high only worsens the winner’s
curse problem. It is then optimal for the firm to have a standard IPO.
In the more interesting case with H1 > L2 , the informational advantage of informed investors is
no longer ordered. In this case, it is possible that a package offering a larger fraction of its payments


for V ∈ L2 , H1 dominates the standard IPO, e.g., one that includes warrants with an exercise

price of L2 . Including these warrants is only optimal if (2) holds, that is, when the asymmetry of
information is more severe for downside cash flows (i.e., below L2 ) than for upside cash flows (i.e.,
above L2 ). Indeed, the left-hand side of (2) is the ratio of the value of a (fictitious) debt claim
with a face value L2 in state s = 2 over that in state s = 1, while the right-hand side of (2) is the
ratio of the warrant’s value in these two states. In the proof of Proposition 3, we show that it is
necessary and sufficient to consider packages with F = L2 to verify (1) and establish (2).
More insights come from (2) when we consider some special cases. Suppose first that L1 = L2 =
L. In this case, investors do not have any informational advantage as far as the cash flows below
L are concerned. Indeed, a promised debt payment of L would be repaid with probability one in
both states of the world, and so the left-hand side of (2) is equal to one in this case. Because the
right-hand side of (2) is always above one, it is better for the firm to issue as few claims that are
informationally sensitive to V being above L as possible. This is achieved by issuing equity only.
Consider next the case where H1 = H2 = H. In this case, manipulations of (2) tell us that
the unit IPO dominates the standard IPO if and only if the ratio L2 /L1 is larger than the ratio
φ2 /(1−φ2 )
φ1 /(1−φ1 ) .

When the firm’s upside potential is known to be H, the decision to include warrants in

its IPO revolves around the relative size of the firm’s assets in place in the two states of the world.
When L1 and L2 are close, learning the state of the world does not provide investors with much
downside information, and so issuing warrants, which are informationally sensitive to the firm’s
upside potential (as captured by the size of φ2 relative to that of φ1 ), is suboptimal. However,
when learning the state of the world removes a great deal of uncertainty about assets in place,
issuing claims that are less sensitive to this information is valuable, and so unit IPOs become
attractive to the firm.
Finally, when φ1 = φ2 = φ, a unit IPO dominates the standard IPO if and only if φ is
12

small enough. The intuition is similar to that for the previous case. When φ approaches one,
information about assets in place (i.e., L1 vs. L2 ) is irrelevant, as the high cash flows are likely to
be realized. Thus claims that are sensitive to downside information can be issued without much of
an informational rent, and this is why issuing only equity is better for the firm. When φ is small
however, the uncertainty revolves primarily around assets in place, as high cash flows do not get
realized frequently in either state of the world. Claims that are sensitive to the downside cash flows
are then expensive as they come with a large informational rent. As a result, the firm is better off
including warrants in its IPO.
We conclude this section by considering the possibility that the firm already has outstanding
debt and showing how this affects the choice between standard and unit IPOs. For simplicity and
ease of exposition, we present our results only in the context of the simple binary specification,
although a similar result obtains more generally. Specifically, let us assume that the firm has
existing debt of face value F0 ∈ (0, H2 ) and that this debt is senior to any new claims issued by the
firm. Because the current bondholders are promised the first tranche of F0 out of the firm’s total
cash flows at time t = 1, this existing debt affects the size of the cash flows that are available to
new investors and, as we show, the tradeoff between standard and unit IPOs.
Consider first the case where the debt is risky in both states of the world, that is, F0 > L2 and
so the firm can only possibly afford its debt when V = Hs is realized. In this case, the firm cannot
promise any cash flow to new investors when V = L1 or V = L2 are realized. As such, the firm
never gains from including warrants in its IPO, as there is no asymmetry of information regarding
downside cash flows as far as the new investors are concerned: they get zero when V turns out
to be Ls , no matter what the state of the world is. In this case, a unit IPO never dominates a
standard IPO.
At the other extreme, when the existing debt is riskless, F0 < L1 , more of it can only make
the inclusion of warrants in the IPO more advantageous to the firm. This is because increasing the
existing riskless debt increases the sensitivity of the downside cash flows to the informed investors’
information. Indeed, as F0 increases from zero to L1 , the ratio of assets in place that are available
to investors in state s = 2 over state s = 1,

L2 −F0
L1 −F0 ,

goes from

L2
L1

up to infinity. This makes securities

that are not sensitive to downside risk, like warrants, more appealing. This leads to the following
result.
Proposition 4. There exists a cutoff F ∗ ∈ (L1 , L2 ], such that existing debt of face value F0 makes
a unit IPO more attractive (relative to the case with no debt) if and only if F0 < F ∗ .
13

Proposition 4 shows that the firm’s preference for a standard IPO over a unit IPO may be
affected by the amount of existing debt even after controlling for asset characteristics. For instance,
a slight preference for a unit IPO given little or no extant debt could be reversed if such debt
obligations are sufficiently large.

4

Optimal IPOs with Callable Warrants

So far, we have characterized optimal IPOs ignoring the possibility that the warrants may be
callable. In this section, we return to our general setup of Section 2 and expand the set of feasible
securities P by including this possibility. To accommodate some information about the firm to
flow into the market before warrants can be called, we assume that the securities purchased by
investors at the time of the IPO (t = 0) are traded prior to the end of the period, at t =

1
2,

in efficient financial markets. We implicitly assume that competition among investors gets their
information incorporated into market prices at date 12 ; that is, the state s is revealed during the
trading round. The warrants are callable in the sense that the firm may reserve the right to call
back each warrant at a pre-specified unit call price k ≥ 0 (for a total price of βk) at t = 12 , provided
that the state-contingent value of the firm at that date exceeds a threshold value ν (i.e., provided
that Vs ≥ ν). As we discuss in Section 5, such call provisions are frequently seen in practice. We
use the term callable unit IPO in what follows in order to distinguish a unit IPO involving callable
warrants from one where the warrants are non-callable.
Call provisions may have value since the securities are publicly traded at time t =
financial markets. Specifically, the market price of any traded security at t =

1
2

1
2

in efficient

is equal to the

expected payoff of that security given state s. The length of time between t = 0 and t =

1
2

can be

thought of as the time it takes for the private information about the firm to get aggregated into
market prices.20 The call provisions on the warrant can be designed in such a way that the firm
will, in equilibrium, be able to call the warrants and force investors to exercise them at date t =

1
2

when the state is s = 2. In contrast, the call restriction ν can be set to a value that is sufficiently
large to prevent the firm from forcing conversion in state s = 1, and allow the warrant holders to
hold onto the valuable options in that state.
20

In reality, because the securities included in the IPO start trading separately immediately after the IPO, the
assumption amounts to one in which competing informed traders quickly push prices to their efficient level through
their trading. The risk neutrality of investors and market-clearing at time t = 12 are sufficient to achieve this. Our
qualitative results depend only on the assumption that the date 1 market prices are sufficiently (and not necessarily
perfectly) informative about the differential information held at t = 0.
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At t = 0, the subscribers to the IPO rationally anticipate that they will end up holding only
equity whenever s = 2, and equity plus warrants whenever s = 1. Furthermore, since a warrant
is less likely to be extinguished via a forcing call when s = 1, the expected equilibrium value of a
warrant at t = 0 is higher conditional on s = 1 than on s = 2. That is, the warrants are more likely
to be valuable exactly when the equity claims are less so. Notice that the equivalence of a call
decision when s = 2 and early exercise at t = 1 is an endogenous equilibrium relation. We show
below that it can be exploited in such a way that the variations in the expected values of equity
and warrant components exactly offset each other, i.e., the total equilibrium value of the package
does not depend on s. This eliminates the winner’s curse problem and the need for underpricing.
To understand more clearly the call and exercise decisions facing investors at date t =

1
2

when

market prices reveal the state s = 1, 2, notice first that the warrants are worth more to investors
alive than dead since ws (X) ≥ Vs − X.21 As a result, investors will not want to exercise the
warrants early unless the firm forces them to do so by calling the warrants, i.e., unless Vs − X ≥ k,
surrendering the warrants for the call price otherwise. On the other hand, the firm will want to call
the warrants only when they are worth more dead than alive to the firm, that is, the firm will prefer
to call whenever ws (X) ≥ k and not to call otherwise. To prevent the firm from extinguishing option
values, the callable warrant contract specifies that the firm cannot call to force exercise unless the
market value of the firm is higher than the trigger value ν. The value of a callable warrant at time
t = 1 in state s is then given by ws (X) if Vs < ν or ws (X) < k, and by max{Vs − X, k} otherwise.
Our next result identifies a general necessary and sufficient condition for a package of equity and
callable warrants to completely eliminate the negative impact of information that is differentially
held across investors.
Proposition 5. There is a callable unit IPO that eliminates any loss from the winner’s curse if
and only if
w1 (V2 ) ≥

V2 − V1
C.
V2 − C

(3)

The proof of Proposition 5 shows that the firm will take advantage of the call provision to force
exercise when good news arrives to the market at time t = 1. This allows it to make the overall
package less sensitive to informational differences across investors, and to eliminate all winner’s
curse costs, whenever the upside potential of the firm, as measured by w1 (V2 ), is large enough.
21

Since the warrants considered in this section are callable, we interpret ws (X) as the expected payoff to a warrant
in state s, provided the warrant is not called and/or exercised prior to t = 1.
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In general, there can be multiple packages of equity and callable warrants that fully eliminate
the winner’s curse. However, Proposition 5 also pins down a unique contract that is sure to achieve
first-best when any other contract achieves first-best. As shown in the proof, this contract is given
by
α=

C
,
V2

β=

V2 − V1 C
,
V2 − C w1 (V2 )

X = V2 ,

k = 0,

ν ∈ (V1 , V2 ).

With this contract, the warrants are called by the firm to force exercise at time t =

(4)
1
2

when

s = 2. When this happens, the warrants are at the money and the call price is zero so that the
investors are left holding equity only. In contrast, when s = 1, the call restrictions prevent the firm
from forcing investors into exercising or surrendering their warrants. As such, the investors keep
holding a package of equity and warrants.
Given this equilibrium behavior at time time t = 12 , the expected value of the contract given
s = 1 is seen, using (4), to be αV1 + βw1 (V2 ) = C, while that given s = 2 is seen to be αV2 = C as
well. Since the expected value of the contract equals C regardless of s, informed investors do not
have any informational advantage over uninformed investors, eliminating the winner’s curse costs
completely.
When condition (3) does not hold, no package of equity and callable (or non-callable) warrants
can achieve first-best. Nonetheless, including callable warrants of the type specified by (4) can still
reduce the winner’s curse problem. This is the object of our next result.
Proposition 6. There is a callable unit IPO that strictly dominates a standard (or unit) IPO if
w1 (V2 ) > 0.
The intuition behind this result is similar to that underlying the previous. Whenever the firm’s
upside potential is large enough in state s = 1 (in the precise sense that w1 (V2 ) > 0), including
callable warrants that will be called and exercised at time t = 12 , if and only if s = 2, reduces the
effect of the winner’s curse at the time of the IPO.22 If this upside potential is negligible, then call
provisions do not have much value. In such cases, unit IPOs (involving non-callable warrants or,
equivalently, callable warrants that are never called) may still be optimal if the uncertainty about
V mostly concerns the downside risk, as shown in the previous section. Of course, relative to a
straight equity issue, the gains from including callable or non-callable warrants may be small (e.g.,
22

It can be shown that the converse of the last result also holds, i.e., if w1 (V2 ) = 0 then a standard IPO dominates
any callable unit IPO in which the warrants are sometimes called in order to force exercise. The details are available
from the authors upon request. Of course a standard IPO may still be dominated by a callable unit IPO in which
the warrants are never called or exercised early, a situation identical to that covered by Proposition 2.
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when w1 (V2 ) is close to zero). If including warrants imposes higher (unmodelled) transactions costs
on the firm, then a straight equity issue will be optimal in such cases as well.
To finish, note that with more than two states of uncertainty, the state-contingent package that
achieves first-best will in general be more complicated. More specifically, the first-best scenario
can then only be implemented by allowing multiple classes of warrants that differ in their equity
shares, strike prices and call provisions. Regardless, a single class of warrants with a fixed strike
price and prespecified equity share will still help reduce the winner’s curse.

5

Empirical Implications

In this section, we present and discuss the empirical predictions that our model yields. Some of
these predictions are consistent with existing empirical evidence, and we do mention the appropriate
references in those cases. The other predictions are novel, and they should provide a way not only
to assess the validity of our model but also to test it against the theories advanced by Schultz (1993)
and by Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997).
Propositions 1-3 imply that a firm is more likely to include warrants as part of its initial offering
of publicly traded securities when there is substantial uncertainty about downside values. Indeed,
in the binary case, Hs − Ls may be interpreted as the value created by the firm’s investment in
successful projects and Ls as the value of the firm’s existing assets. Since information differences
about a firm’s existing assets (i.e., the downside) are likely higher for firms with intangible assets,
we have the following prediction.
Implication 1. Firms with intangible assets are more likely to use unit IPOs than other firms.
The evidence provided by Schultz (1993) supports this prediction. He finds that unit IPOs are
rarely used by firms in the mining, transportation, construction and retail industries. On the other
hand, unit IPOs seem to be highly favored by firms in business services (which include computer
software), engineering, health services and personal services. Similar evidence that unit IPOs tend
to be used by firms in service-oriented and high-technology industries is provided by Jain (1994),
by Lee, Lee and Taylor (2003) and by Garner and Marshall (2005). Also supporting this prediction
is the evidence provided by Garner and Marshall (2005) that firms whose asset return volatility is
higher, issue a larger number of warrants per share as part of their unit IPO. In other words, these
firms avoid issuing securities whose cash flows are sensitive to the value of assets in place as much
as possible.
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For the uncertainty about downside values to matter, it has to be the case that there is a sizeable
chance that these downside values occur for a given firm. For instance, as discussed in Section 3.2
with φ1 = φ2 ≡ φ for binary distributions, it must be the case that φ is low (so that Pr{V = Ls }
is large) for a unit IPO to be optimal.
Implication 2. Firms that use unit IPOs are more likely to experience negative performance shocks
after they go public than firms that use standard (equity-only) IPOs.
Various measures of firm performance could be used to assess the validity of this prediction,
including firm profits, cash flows, return on assets, and stock price. Of course, when these variables
decline over time (or decline relative to competitors), the firm is also more likely to find itself in
financial trouble and perhaps even to close its doors. The empirical evidence provided by Garner
and Marshall (2005), showing that firms that use unit IPOs tend to go bankrupt more often and
more quickly than firms that use regular IPOs, appears to be consistent with this prediction.23
In Proposition 4, we find that firms with low levels of risky debt are more likely to include
warrants in their IPOs. This is because some uncertainty remains about the portion of firm value
that belongs to equity holders in the low states of the world, since the firm may not be bankrupt
in all such states. Lee, Lee and Taylor (2003) and Howe and Olsen (2006) provide evidence that
indeed unit IPOs are used by firms with less outstanding debt than regular IPOs.
Implication 3. Firms with low levels of debt use unit IPOs more than firms with high levels of
debt.
We now turn to the empirical predictions of our model that come from the callability feature
of the warrants, as described in Propositions 5 and 6. In particular, these propositions establish
that callable warrants are especially useful when warrants retain some option value even in the
bad states of the world, that is, when w1 (V2 ) is large or at least positive. Since options are more
valuable when the volatility of the underlying asset is large, the stock’s volatility conditional on low
firm performance, negative industry shocks, or overall bear markets becomes an important element
of the firm’s decision to include callable warrants in its unit IPO.
Implication 4. The warrants included in unit IPOs are more likely to be callable for firms whose
cash flows and performance are highly volatile when the firm, the industry or the economy experiences negative shocks.
23

Because we do not model bankruptcy per se, this prediction only makes sense when the level of debt and debt
riskiness are controlled for, especially given implication 3 below. Also, it is worth mentioning that Jain (1994) finds
that, after controlling for size, risk and underwriter reputation, the survival rate between the two groups is similar.
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Because the callability of warrants does not play a role in Chemmanur and Fulghieri’s (1997)
model and is not affected by conditional volatility in Schultz’s (1993) model, this prediction is novel.
Also, although Schultz (1993) documents that the majority of warrants in unit IPOs are callable
(87% of his sample), no information is provided about the determinants of the callability decision
of issuing firms. As such, this prediction remains to be tested. As before, the firm’s performance
can be measured using profits or the firm’s stock price, and so a cross-sectional comparison of the
volatility of this measure between firms that do and do not make their IPO warrants callable would
provide a direct test of Implication 4.
Our second prediction concerns the number of warrants to be included in the IPO package.
Although we do not demonstrate this formally, it is easy to verify, using (4), that the ratio of
warrants to shares of equity that are included in the issue,

β
α,

decreases with V1 , and increases with

V2 . As such, large differences in the firm’s performance in good and bad states, as proxied by the
unconditional volatility of the aforementioned performance measures, is likely to lead the firm to
include more warrants in its IPO. Furthermore, it is easy to verify that

β
α

is increasing in C, and

so we would expect firms that raise more capital at the time of their IPO to include more warrants
in their securities offering.
Implication 5. A larger ratio of warrants to shares of equity are included in the unit IPOs of firms
with large (unconditional) performance volatility and firms that sell a larger portion of their value
when they first go public.
Again, little existing empirical evidence can be used to assess the validity of this prediction.
The one exception is the work of Garner and Marshall (2005) who find that the proportion of
firm value sold as warrants increases with the firms’ riskiness (as measured by the volatility of the
post-IPO stock price, return on assets, or earnings per share), and with the ratio of warrants to
equity shares in the unit IPO package. Because these findings are consistent with the signaling
hypothesis underlying Chemmanur and Fulghieri’s (1997) model however, they cannot be taken as
exclusively supportive of our model.
The last direct implications of our model relate to the call and exercise prices (k and X) of
the warrants included in the IPO. First, as discussed in the discussion following Proposition 5 and
as shown in (4), the call price that makes the equity-warrant package efficient in most scenarios
is zero, and so we would expect the call price that firms set for their warrants to be low. As far
as we know, only Schultz (1993) provide any evidence on this front, and he finds that the average
warrant call price is quite low, at about $0.05 per warrant.
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Implication 6. The call price that firms set for the warrants included in their IPO is predicted to
be low.
Finally, as discussed earlier, the exercise price of the warrants must be large enough so that the
option’s payoff to investors is not so large when the firm forces conversion. Again, this is consistent
with the evidence provided by Schultz (1993) that the exercise price is more than 25% above the
IPO’s price per share. Looking at (4), X increases with V2 , and so we also expect the exercise price
of the warrant to be larger for firms whose growth potential is extreme is some states of the world,
another prediction that has yet to be tested.
Implication 7. The exercise price of the option is predicted to be large relative to the stock price
at the time of the issue, and it is expected to be larger when the firm’s growth prospects are large.

6

Conclusion

When some investors possess information about the prospect of a firm that other investors do not
possess, a winner’s curse exist at the time the firm decides to go public. In particular, uninformed
investors are more likely to receive shares when informed investors know something negative about
the firm and stay away from the new issue. To protect themselves, the uninformed investors require
a discount in order to participate in the issue, and this is costly to the issuing firm. To resolve this
problem, our model proposes a security design approach which allows firms to pool warrant options
along with equity shares in the security offering. As we show, the inclusion of warrants becomes
advantageous when the downside risk of the firm is large and subject to information asymmetries
across investors. Moreover, the presence of warrants in the IPO package sometimes allows the firm
to eliminate the winner’s curse altogether. For this to be possible, the firm must make the warrants
callable in high states of the world and it must be the case that the warrants are still valuable
in low states of the world. Indeed, this combination dynamically removes the monotonicity of the
packaged securities as a function of the firm’s eventual value, and lowers the effective informational
advantage of informed investors down to zero.
Our model considers the possibility that the issuing firm has some private debt outstanding
and shows how this can affect its choice of financing at the time of the IPO. However, it does
not consider the possibility of pooling a debt issue with the firm’s IPO, as this is never done
by firms in the United States. Still, the use of debt could improve the firm’s security design
when the inclusion of warrants in IPO units is either insufficient to eliminate the winner’s curse
20

problem or simply infeasible for other exogenous reasons. Indeed, because debt contracts are less
sensitive to information asymmetries related to the firms’ upside potential, it will be the case that
firms with high downside risk and potentially large information asymmetries across investors for
downside values issue public equity before they issue public debt. Interestingly, this result has been
empirically documented in a paper by Berkovitch, Gesser and Sarig (2006). More precisely, in their
sample of privately held firms who access the public market for financing for the first time, 23% of
them do so via a public debt issue as opposed to a public equity issue. They also find that these
firms have a higher asset base and invest less in R&D, both consistent with lower downside risk
and smaller information asymmetries across investors.
Although our theory is explained in the context of an IPO, its point is more general. Indeed,
any situation in which financing is subject to the winner’s curse problem can be approached from
a security-design perspective. This, for example, could be the case for seasoned equity offerings
(SEOs). Because the information asymmetries that prevail at the time of the IPO are likely to
persist past the outcome of the IPO, we would expect later issues to also be affected by the
winner’s curse problem, although probably not to the same extent as the IPO. Because warrants
are used when information asymmetries about downside values are large, we would expect firms
that use unit IPOs to keep issuing securities that are less sensitive to downside outcomes. Indeed,
Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Patel (2000) find that publicly traded firms with a larger asset base are
significantly more likely to access public debt markets for the first time (i.e., go through an initial
public debt offering, or a “debt IPO”). Moreover, Byoun, and Moore (2003) find that stock-warrant
units are used in seasoned offerings by younger, riskier firms that did not receive venture-capital
financing and whose offering was intermediated by a less reputable underwriter.
Another situation in which a security-design approach to the winner’s curse could be useful is
that of an entrepreneur seeking private financing from a venture capital firm (VC). The asymmetric
information problem then arises from the fact that any one VC does not know whether it was
approached before the other VCs by the entrepreneur. A VC that is approached second is clearly
at a disadvantage since, presumably, the first VC passed on the deal for a reason, i.e., the prospects
of the firm are not as good conditional on the fact that the first VC decided not to finance.
Because of this possibility, VC firms should demand a discount on their shares of the firm, unless
an appropriately chosen set of securities can be put together in one financing contract. As we show
in this paper, the option features embedded in the securities included in these contracts may affect
their effectiveness in solving the winner’s curse problem.
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7

Appendix A

Proof of Proposition 1
Take any package P (α, β, X) = αV + β max{0, V − X} ∈ P. For any random variable Ω that


depends on V , we denote the expected value conditional on state s = 1, 2 as Ωs ≡ E Ω | s and
the unconditional expected value under probability q = θ, λ, as Ω̄q ≡ qΩ2 + (1 − q)Ω1 . Since any
issue must be valued at C by uninformed investors in order to guarantee the investment in the new
project, we must have
αV̄θ + β w̄θ (X) = C.

(5)

From the firm’s perspective, however, this package is worth αV̄λ + β w̄λ (X) > C at the time of the
issue, as the probability of state s = 2 is then λ > θ. The difference represents the informational
rent R captured by the informed investors which, using (5) to replace α, is given by

h
i V̄ − V̄ h
i
h
i

λ
θ
C − β w̄θ (X) + β w̄λ (X) − w̄θ (X) .
R = α V̄λ − V̄θ + β w̄λ (X) − w̄θ (X) =
V̄θ
Since the optimal package must minimize this informational rent, the choice between a regular IPO
(that has β = 0) and a unit IPO (that has β > 0) depends on the sign of
−β w̄θ (X)

h
i
V̄λ − V̄θ
+ β w̄λ (X) − w̄θ (X) .
V̄θ

In particular, the regular IPO is preferred if and only if this expression is positive for all possible
exercise prices above zero, that is if and only if
V̄λ − V̄θ
w̄λ (X) − w̄θ (X)
<
w̄θ (X)
V̄θ
for all X > 0. Simple algebra and the fact that λ > θ shows that this inequality is equivalent to
w1 (X)
w2 (X)
<
.
V1
V2

(6)

Since ws (X) = Vs − Ds (X), (6) is equivalent to (1). This completes the proof.

Proof of Proposition 2
(a) Suppose that r(v) is a non-decreasing function of v. By Proposition 1, we need to show
that d(X) ≡

D2 (X)
D1 (X)

<

V2
V1

for all X > 0 where, as before, Ds (X) can be interpreted as the value of

(fictitious) debt of face value X in state s. For any X > 0, we have
Ds (X) =

Z

X
0

h
i
vφs (v) dv + X 1 − Φs (X) ,
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and so Ds′ (X) = 1 − Φs (X). This means that
d′ (X) =

i
D2′ (X)D1 (X) − D1′ (X)D2 (X)
D2′ (X) − D1′ (X)d(X)
1 − Φ1 (X) h
=
=
r(X)
−
d(X)
,
D1 (X)
D1 (X)
D12 (X)

Furthermore, for future use, we show that limX→0 d(X) = 1. Note that the limit is in indeterminate
form as both the numerator and the denominator goes to zero as X goes to zero. Using l’Hôpital’s
rule once leads to limX→0 d(X) =
We now claim that

d′ (X)

1−Φ2 (X)
1−Φ1 (X)

= 1.

≥ 0 for all X > 0. Contrary to our claim, suppose there exists X̃ > 0

such that d′ (X̃) < 0. First note that d′ (X) > 0 if and only if r(X) − d(X) > 0. Furthermore, notice
that we must have r(X) ≥ 1 for all X > 0, because Φ2 (·) first-order stochastically dominates Φ1 (·).
Consequently, we must have d(X̃) > r(X̃) ≥ 1. Since limX→0 d(X) = 1, there must exist X̂ < X̃
such that d′ (X̂) = 0 (and so r(X̂) = d(X̂), as shown above) with d(X̂) > d(X̃). Thus we have
r(X̂) = d(X̂) > d(X̃) > r(X̃). However, this contradicts the monotonicity of r(X), completing the
argument that d′ (X) ≥ 0 for all X > 0.
The fact that d′ (X) ≥ 0 for all X > 0 implies that d(X̃) ≤ d(X̂) for any X̃ < X̂. Also,
since Φ1 (·) and Φ2 (·) are not everywhere identical, there exists X̃ > X such that d(X) < d(X̃).
Therefore, for any X > 0, we have d(X) < d(X̃) ≤ limX̂→∞ d(X̂) =
(b) Since limX→∞ r(X) <
d(X) > r(X) and so

d′ (X)

V2
V1

V2
V1 ,

establishing the result.

= limX→∞ d(X), it must be the case that, for all X large enough,

< 0, using the same arguments as in the proof of part (a). This in turn

implies that, for all such X, d(X) > limX̃→∞ d(X̃) =

V2
V1 ,

yielding the result by Proposition 1.

Proof of Proposition 3
We know from Proposition 1 that, for the unit IPO to strictly dominate the standard IPO, it
is necessary and sufficient to find an X ∈ (0, H2 ) such that
d(X) ≡

D2 (X)
V2
>
.
D1 (X)
V1

Notice that for X ≤ L1 , we have d(X) = 1 < VV21 . Notice also that d(X) is a non-decreasing function


of X for all X ∈ H1 , H2 , and that d(H2 ) = VV21 .

Let us first consider the case in which H1 ≤ L2 . Then d(X) is also increasing in X for X ∈


L1 , H1 , and so d(X) is a non-decreasing function of X for all X ∈ L1 , H2 . This in turn implies

that the standard IPO dominates the unit IPO, as d(X) then increases from d(L1 ) = 1 ≤
d(H2 ) =

V2
V1

≤

V2
V1 ,

V2
V1

to

without ever decreasing as X increases from zero to H2 . This completes the

proof for the case where H1 ≤ L2 . Accordingly, we focus on the case in which H1 > L2 for the rest

of the proof. Notice then that for X ∈ L1 , L2 ,
d(X) =

X
,
φ1 X + (1 − φ1 )L1
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which is an increasing function of X. Notice next that, for X ∈ L2 , H1 , we have
d(X) =
and
d′ (X) =

φ2 X + (1 − φ2 )L2
φ1 X + (1 − φ1 )L1

φ2 D1 (X) − φ1 D2 (X)
,

2
D1 (X)
D2 (X)
D1 (X)

φ2
φ1

2
or, equivalently, if and only if L
L1 >


φ2 /(1−φ2 )
.
Thus
d(X)
is
either
entirely
non-decreasing
or
entirely
non-increasing
for
X
∈
L
,
H
.
2
1
φ /(1−φ )

which is strictly negative if and only if d(X) =
1

>

1

If d(X) is non-decreasing in this interval, then it is non-decreasing for all X ∈ (0, H2 ) and so, using
the same reasoning as before, d(X) ≤

V2
V1

for all X ∈ (0, H2 ). As such, for the unit IPO to strictly


dominate the standard IPO, it is necessary that d(X) be non-increasing in the interval L2 , H1 .

Indeed, it is necessary that the local maximum of d(X) at X = L2 be global, that is, it is necessary
that
d(L2 ) =

L2
V2
L2 + φ2 (H2 − L2 )
>
=
.
φ1 L2 + (1 − φ1 )L1
V1
L1 + φ1 (H1 − L1 )

The denominator of the last term can be rewritten as L1 +φ1 (L2 −L1 )+φ1 (H1 −L2 ). Rearrangement
of this term yields φ1 L2 + (1 − φ1 )L1 + φ1 (H1 − L2 ). Therefore, we can rewrite the inequality as
L2 + φ2 (H2 − L2 )
L2
>
.
φ1 L2 + (1 − φ1 )L1
φ1 L2 + (1 − φ1 )L1 + φ1 (H1 − L2 )
This inequality in turn simplifies to
φ (H2 − L2 )
L2
> 2
,
φ1 L2 + (1 − φ1 )L1
φ1 (H1 − L2 )
which is necessary for the unit auction to strictly dominate the standard auction. The sufficiency
of this last inequality for the unit auction to strictly dominate the standard auction follows directly
from Proposition 1.

Proof of Proposition 4
Observe first that if the face value of the existing debt is F0 > L2 , then from the perspective
of new investors, the firm’s cash flows in state s are L′s ≡ 0 or Hs′ ≡ Hs − F0 , with probability
1 − φs and φs respectively. As such, using the notation (and strategy) introduced in the proof of
Proposition 1b, we have d(F ) =

φ2
φ1

for all F ∈ (0, H1 − F0 ). Since

V2′
V1′

the standard auction strictly dominates if H2 > H1 (since we then

φ2 (H2 −F0 )
φ1 (H1 −F0 ) , this implies that
V′
have d(F ) < V2′ ), while the two
1

=

IPO formats are identical otherwise.
Observe next that if the face value of the existing debt is F0 < L1 , then from the perspective of
new investors, the firm’s cash flows in state s are L′s ≡ Ls − F0 or Hs′ ≡ Hs − F0 , with probability
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1 − φs and φs respectively. Replacing Ls by L′s and Hs by Hs′ in (2), we obtain
L2 − F0
φ (H2 − L2 )
< 2
.
φ1 L2 + (1 − φ1 )L1 − F0
φ1 (H1 − L1 )
Since the left-hand side of this expression is monotonically increasing in F0 , the inequality becomes
more difficult to satisfy as F0 increases, and so unit IPOs become more attractive. This result now
follows directly via the intermediate value theorem and continuity.

Proof of Proposition 5
Sufficiency. We show that if (3) is satisfied, one can construct a callable unit IPO that achieves
first-best. Consider a package P (α, β, X) of equity and callable warrants with a call price of k and
a trigger value ν ∈ (V1 , V2 ). Then the firm can call the warrants at time t =
Suppose that k = 0 = V2 − X so that, when s = 2 at time t =

1
2,

1
2

if and only if s = 2.

the warrant is at the money and

the warrant holders exercise if the warrant is called. Furthermore, set α and β such that the value
of the (optimally exercised and called) package in each state is equal to C, that is,
αV2 = C,

and

αV1 + βw1 (V2 ) = C.

(7)
(8)

Such a contract, if it exists, has no information rents associated with it, since the expected value
of the security equals C, state by state. We look for conditions which guarantee

 existence. To this
V1
C
C
end, note first that the solution to (7) and (8) is α = V2 and β = w1 (V2 ) 1 − V2 . Because V2 > V1

(by the first-order stochastic dominance of Φ2 (·) over Φ1 (·)), it is clear that β > 0. It just remains
to show that β ≤ 1 − α, or that
C
w1 (V2 )



V1
1−
V2



≤1−

C
,
V2

as required by the definition of P. This last inequality is equivalent to (3).
Necessity. Suppose that a package P (α, β, X) ∈ P together with call provisions {k, ν} achieve
first-best, with α ∈ (ᾱ, 1), β ∈ [0, 1 − α], and X > 0. Because equity-only financing (i.e., β = 0)
cannot eliminate the winner’s curse problem, it must be the case that β is strictly positive. We
proceed in steps.
Step 1: The warrants are called if and only if s = 2, that is, ν ∈ (V1 , V2 ).
By first-order stochastic dominance, it is immediate that the first-best cannot be achieved
if (i) the warrants are never called, or (ii) the warrants are always called and always turned in
(unexercised), or (iii) the warrants are always called and always exercised. If the warrants are always
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called, and they are sometimes exercised and sometimes turned in, then they will be exercised when
s = 2 (requiring that V2 − X ≥ k) and turned in when s = 1. To achieve first-best, we need
αV2 + β(V2 − X) = C,

and

αV1 + βk = C.
However this is impossible, since V2 > V1 (by first-order stochastic dominance) and V2 − X ≥ k ≥ 0.
We conclude that the warrants will be called at time t =

1
2

if and only if s = 2, that is, we have

ν ∈ (V1 , V2 ).
Step 2: Without loss of generality, k ≥ V2 − X.
We show that for any first-best package with a warrant strike price that satisfies k′ < V2 − X,
then there exists another package that also achieves first-best, that differs only in the call price
k, and satisfies k ≥ V2 − X. To see this suppose that V2 − X > k′ ≥ 0 so that the warrants are
exercised when called in state s = 2. Since first-best is achieved, we must have
αV2 + β(V2 − X) = C,

and

αV1 + βw1 (X) = C.
Consider another warrant contract that differs only in the call price, which is set at k = V2 − X.
Clearly, with such a contract, the warrant holders are indifferent between exercising their warrants
and turning them into the firm unexercised. Also, the contract achieves first-best as it satisfies
αV2 + βk = C,

and

αV1 + βw1 (X) = C,

(9)
(10)

together with the constraints that
k ≥ 0,
ᾱ ≤ α ≤ 1,

k ≥ V2 − X,
0 ≤ β ≤ 1 − α.

(11)
(12)

Thus, without loss of generality, the contract can be such that warrant holders weakly prefer to
surrender the warrants when called, and such that it satisfies (9)-(12).
Step 3: Without loss of generality, k = 0.
Notice first that it must be the case that k < w1 (X). For if k ≥ w1 (X), since α, β > 0 and
V2 > V1 , we cannot then have (9)-(10) hold. We show next that if k > 0 in a package that achieves
first-best, then there exists another package that also achieves first-best with k′ < k. To see this,
suppose that k > 0 in a package that achieves first-best. From (11) and β > 0, we have α, β ∈ (0, 1).
Furthermore, from (9)-(10), we have β > 0 which in turn implies that α < 1. Consider a differential
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change in k of amount dk < 0, together with changes in X, α and β, such that dX = −dk > 0,
and further, (9)-(10) continue to hold, i.e.,
V2 dα + k dβ + β dk = 0,

and

V1 dα + w1 (X) dβ + βw1′ (X) dX = 0,
where w1′ (X) ≡

dw1 (X)
dX

(13)
(14)

∈ (−1, 0). Since dX = −dk, the second inequality in (11) will continue to

hold after the change. We need to guarantee that second one in (12) also does, i.e., that dα+dβ ≤ 0.
Using dX = −dk in (13)-(14) and solving for dα and dβ in terms of dk, we obtain


(V1 − w1 (X)) + w1′ (X)(V2 − k)
dα + dβ = β
dk.
V2 w1 (X) − V1 k
Since dk < 0, β > 0, V2 > V1 and w1 (X) > k, it follows that dα + dβ ≤ 0 if and only if
V1 − w1 (X) ≥ −w1′ (X)(V2 − k).
But this follows from observing that
V1 − w1 (X) = D1 (X) ≥ (1 − Φ1 (X))X = −w1′ (X)X
and, from the second inequality in (11), that X ≥ V2 − k. This concludes step 3.
Step 4: It must be the case that (3) is satisfied.
Since, without loss of generality, we have k = 0 (from step 3) and k ≥ V2 − X (from step 2), it
follows that X ≥ V2 . Using this in (9), we have α =

C
V2 .

Since the warrant value is non-decreasing

in X, for (10) to hold it is necessary that
C

V1
+ βw1 (V2 ) ≥ C
V2

(15)

for some β ∈ (0, 1 − VC2 ]. Clearly, since V2 > V1 , the left-hand side of (15) is strictly smaller than C
at β = 0. Since the left-hand side of (15) is monotonic in β, a necessary condition for (15) to hold
is that the left-hand side be larger than C at β = 1 −

C
V2 .

That is, it is necessary that



V1
C
C
+ 1−
w1 (V2 ) ≥ C,
V2
V2
which is equivalent to (3). This completes the proof.

Proof of Proposition 6
If (3) holds, then we know from Proposition 5 that callable unit IPOs achieve first-best and so
the result trivially holds. So suppose instead that (3) does not hold but that w1 (V2 ) > 0. We show
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that a standard IPO is dominated by package that includes callable warrants. The proof for the
unit IPO is entirely analogous and so is left out.
Consider a package with P (α, β, X) ∈ P that has k = V2 − X = 0, ν ∈ (V1 , V2 ). Since (3) does
not hold, such a package does not achieve first-best, and so it must satisfy
αV2 = C + δ 2 ,

and

αV1 + βw1 (V2 ) = C − δ 1 ,
for some δ 1 > 0 and δ2 > 0. The informational rent paid by the firm (and captured by the informed
investors) are then given by
h
i
R = (λ − θ)(δ 1 + δ 2 ) = (λ − θ) (V2 − V1 )α − βw1 (V2 ) .
At the same time, since the issue raises C in capital for the firm, we must also have
h
i
θαV2 + (1 − θ) αV1 + βw1 (V2 ) = C.

(16)

Notice that if β = 0, such a package reduces to a straight equity issue. Consider a change to an
equity-warrant package by increasing β from zero to a positive value, and adjusting α downwards
so that (16) continues to hold. Then we have dα
dβ < 0, and so


dR
∂α
= (λ − θ) (V2 − V1 )
− w1 (V2 ) < 0.
dβ
∂β

8

Appendix B

In this appendix, we show that the accounting convention used for the warrants throughout the
paper is without loss of generality. More specifically, we show that our convention to assume that
the warrant holders get a fraction β of the firm’s value above X (the strike price of the warrant) is
equivalent to one in which βX is added to the firm’s value when the warrants are exercised.
To see this, let us assume that the firm initially has n = 1 shares outstanding, and suppose that
the IPO is done via a package issue consisting of nS shares and nW warrants with a strike price of
X. At expiration, the new claim-holders will own a fraction nS of the firm’s value, which we denote
by V , if they choose not to exercise their warrants. If they exercise for a price of nW X, then these
new claim-holders will own a fraction

nS +nW
1+nW

of the firm’s value, which is now V + nW X. Thus, the

new claim-holders exercise if and only if
nS + nW
(V + nW X) − nW X > nS V,
1 + nW
which is equivalent to V > X. Of course, the original shareholders own the remainder of the firm,
that is, (1 − nS )V when the warrants are not exercised, and
are exercised.
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1−nS
1+nW (V

+ nW X) when the warrants

Throughout the paper, we assume that the firm’s IPO consists of α shares and β warrants with
a strike price of X, with the accounting convention that the new claim-holders get a fraction α of
V plus a fraction β of V − X when they exercise their warrants (i.e., when V > X). With this
convention, the original shareholders get (1 − α)V when the warrants are not exercised and they
get (1 − α)X + (1 − α − β)(V − X) = (1 − α − β)V + βX when the warrants are exercised.
This accounting convention is without loss of generality if we can show that there is a unique
mapping between {nS , nW } and {α, β} such that the cash flows received by the original shareholders
and the new claim-holders are exactly the same in all scenarios. This will be the case if and only
if we can find a unique {α, β} such the the following equalities hold:
(1 − α)V = (1 − nS )V,
1 − nS
(1 − α − β)V + βX =
(V + nW X),
1 + nW
αV = nS V,
nS + nW
− nW X = αV + β(V − X).
1 + nW

(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)

The first (last) two equalities ensure that the original shareholders (new claim-holders) receive the
same cash flows when V ≤ X and when V > X. It is easy to verify that
α = nS

and β =

nW (1 − nS )
1 + nW

(21)

is the unique solution to (17)-(20). Alternatively, our accounting convention is equivalent to one in
which the strike price is added to the firm’s value when the warrants are exercised as long as we
set
nS = α

and nW =

β
,
1−α−β

(22)

which is obtained by inverting (21). In short, our accounting convention is without loss of generality.
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